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Abstract
Adversarial robustness has become an impor-
tant research topic given empirical demon-
strations on the lack of robustness of deep
neural networks. Unfortunately, recent theo-
retical results suggest that adversarial train-
ing induces a strict tradeoff between classi-
fication accuracy and adversarial robustness.
In this paper, we propose and then study a
new regularization for any margin classifier or
deep neural network. We motivate this reg-
ularization by a novel generalization bound
that shows a tradeoff in classifier accuracy
between maximizing its margin and average
margin. We thus call our approach an aver-
age margin (AM) regularization, and it con-
sists of a linear term added to the objective.
We theoretically show that for certain distri-
butions AM regularization can both improve
classifier accuracy and robustness to adver-
sarial attacks. We conclude by using both
synthetic and real data to empirically show
that AM regularization can strictly improve
both accuracy and robustness for support
vector machine’s (SVM’s) and deep neural
networks, relative to unregularized classifiers
and adversarially trained classifiers.
1 INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent renewal of interest in the ro-
bustness of classifiers, primarly due to the observed
fragility of deep classifiers to nearly-imperceptible ad-
versarial corruptions [Szegedy et al., 2014, Fawzi,
Fawzi, and Frossard, 2015, Dalvi et al., 2004, Big-
gio and Roli, 2017]. In response, numerous adversarial
training approaches have been proposed, both in the
This work was supported by the UC Berkeley Center for
Long-Term Cybersecurity.
context of linear margin classifiers [Lanckriet et al.,
2002, Trafalis and Gilbert, 2007, Bertsimas et al., 2017]
and deep classifiers [Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy,
2015, Fawzi, Fawzi, and Frossard, 2015]. These ap-
proaches train classifiers so as to minimize loss with
respect to adversarially-perturbed data.
Interestingly, such adversarial methods have been
shown to be equivalent to a particular type of reg-
ularization in the context of linear margin classi-
fiers and regression [?Xu, Caramanis, and Mannor,
2009, Livni, Crammer, and Globerson, 2012, Bertsi-
mas et al., 2017]. While regularization protects against
(though does not always eliminate) overfitting [Cortes
and Vapnik, 1995], such outcomes critically depend
upon having regularization that is congruous to the
underlying data distributions [Aggarwal and Yu, 2001,
Scholkopf and Smola, 2001, Lanckriet et al., 2002, We-
ston and Herbrich, 1999, Bi and Zhang, 2005, Fawzi,
Fawzi, and Frossard, 2015, Xu, Caramanis, and Man-
nor, 2009].
Here, we argue that adversarial training ignores no-
table attributes of the data. For instance, image data
often has manifold structure [Gerber et al., 2009, Pless
and Souvenir, 2009, Peyre´, 2009]. Yet adversarial train-
ing regularizes with respect to full-dimensional pertur-
bations and not with respect to any underlying man-
ifold structure. This is significant because the imper-
ceptibility of the most successful adversarial perturba-
tions suggests that they lie orthogonal to these mani-
folds [Szegedy et al., 2014]. Thus, any robust method-
ology that does not exploit this kind of structure will
likely remain susceptible to adversarial attacks.
Recently, Tsipras et al. [2018] have claimed that there
is a strict trade-off between the accuracy of a classifier
and its robustness to adversarial perturbations. They
augment their argument with demonstrations of this
inverse relationship on a specific dataset, and claim
that adversarial training best minimizes the cost of
robustness. This paper shows that this is trade-off is
not general and that, in fact, robustness and accuracy
can grow concurrently for broad classes of datasets.
We make three main contributions in this paper: First,
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we develop a novel generalization bound that shows
that classifier accuracy depends on a tradeoff between
minimum margin and average margin. Second, we use
the insights of this bound to propose a new regulariza-
tion that we call average margin (AM) regularization.
This regularization consists of a linear term added to
the objective, and is hence amenable to efficient nu-
merical computation. We prove that for certain distri-
butions, AM regularization can improve both accuracy
and adversarial robustness of a classifier. Third, we
use synthetic and real data to empirically show that
AM regularization can generate support vector ma-
chine (SVM) and deep neural network classifiers that
strictly dominate (in terms of accuracy and robust-
ness) classifiers computed with or without adversar-
ial training. Taken together, these results suggest that
the phenomenon of adversarial fragility is an issue of
overfitting rather than a fundamental issue unique to
adversarial attacks.
1.1 Robust Linear SVM
Linear SVM relies upon on maximizing training mar-
gin by minimizing the hinge-loss, which makes it sen-
sitive to large misclassification errors. Several meth-
ods have been proposed to alleviate this sensitivity by
truncating the hinge-loss function [Krause and Singer,
2004, Collobert et al., 2006, Liu and Shen, 2006,
Bartlett and Mendelson, 2002]. A major issue with this
approach is that it forfeits the convexity of the origi-
nal problem: Suzumura et al. [2014] explore the use of
the convex-concave method, and Yu et al. [2010] use a
clipping method to handle this nonconvexity.
Song, Hu, and Xie [2002] and Masnadi-Shirazi, Ma-
hadevan, and Vasconcelos [2010] propose methods that
penalize outliers uniformly while maintaining the con-
vexity of the hinge-loss, and Aggarwal and Yu [2001]
propose a method to generate sparse projections to
minimize the visibility of outliers. Instead of attempt-
ing to devalue outliers, Xu, Crammer, and Schuur-
mans [2006] formulate a mixed-integer problem with
the hinge-loss that removes them, and Weston and
Herbrich [1999] redesign the loss function entirely us-
ing bounds on the leave-one-out cross-validation error.
Adversarial training has also been considered for SVM:
Lanckriet et al. [2002], Trafalis and Gilbert [2007],
Bertsimas et al. [2017] take a minimax approach, solv-
ing bilevel programs to design classifiers robust to
worst-case perturbations of either a given distribution
or a given magnitude. Bertsimas et al. [2017] builds on
the heuristic methods of Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov
[2011], Natarajan et al. [2013] in considering robust-
ness of classifiers to noise in the label, as opposed to
only the features.
1.2 Robust Deep Classifiers
Adversarial fragility is very pronounced in deep clas-
sifiers. Szegedy et al. [2014] first brought to light the
sensitivity of deep learners to adversarial noise, and
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy [2015], Fawzi, Fawzi,
and Frossard [2015] followed up with empirical and
theoretical examinations of this instability. It has been
shown that relatively minute and visually unrecogniz-
able perturbations (in the case of images) can signifi-
cantly impact the accuracy of these learners, and some
work has been done on characterizing these minimal
deviations [Dalvi et al., 2004, Biggio and Roli, 2017].
Notably, Carlini and Wagner [2017] showed that many
existing methods for adversarially-robust deep classi-
fication are not wholly effective. However, there has
been a spate of promising recent results in this direc-
tion, some of which come with theoretical guarantees
[Madry et al., 2017, Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfel-
low, 2018, Raghunathan, Steinhardt, and Liang, 2018].
1.3 Outline
Section 2 begins by describing the notation used in
this paper, and then it describes the problem setup
that will be considered. Next, Section 3 introduces a
novel generalization bound, proposes the average mar-
gin (AM) regularization, and then theoretically studies
properties of this regularization for a specific distri-
bution. We conclude with Section 3, which presents
empirical results comparing linear classifiers and deep
neural networks that have been computed using differ-
ent regularization and adversarial training approaches,
using both synthetic and real datasets.
2 NOTATION AND SETUP
We use N (µ,Σ) to refer to a multivariate normal dis-
tribution with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ. Also,
let 0d and 1d refer to vectors of length d with all entries
zero and one, respectively, and Id to the d× d identity
matrix. These subscripts will be dropped when the size
is obvious due to context. In contrast, the function no-
tation 1(·) refers to the indicator function. We use Xi
to denote the i-th row of a matrix X. For some kernel
function k : Rd×Rd → R, let the matrix K(X,X ′) be
such that K(X,X ′)ij = k(Xi, X
′
j).
Consider data observations (x, y) ∼ D where x ∈ Rd
and y ∈ {+1,−1}. In the standard binary classifica-
tion regime, the goal is compute a classifier h : Rd →
{+1,−1} to predict a label y from from a feature vec-
tor x. For a margin classifier from a family H, this
is achieved by minimizing minh∈H 1n
∑n
i=1 `(yih(xi)),
which is the sample average of some given loss func-
tion `(·). The expected classification error rate of a
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Figure 1: This example shows that maximizing the
margin on training data can reduce classification ac-
curacy since it does not use data far from the mar-
gin boundary. The marks are sampled data, the two
supports of the data distributions for the two labels
y ∈ {−1,+1} are the two shaded rectangles, and the
dashed line is the maximum margin linear classifier.
classifier h is defined as L(h) = E(1(y 6= sign(h(x)))).
Adversarial robustness for a classifier h refers to its
ability to maintain accuracy in predicting a label y
when given a corrupted corresponding feature vector
x + δ, where corruption δ is chosen by an adversary
and has magnitude bounded by a quantity e. The ex-
pected adversarial classification error rate of a classi-
fier h when the adversary can perturb data by e mag-
nitude is L(h, e) = E(maxδ:‖δ‖≤e 1(y 6= h(x + δ))).
The inner maximization is interpreted as an adversary
choosing an attack. Also note that L(h, 0) = L(h).
3 A NEW REGULARIZATION
Margin classifiers primarily use only data near the
boundaries of different classes for the purpose of es-
timating the parameters of the classifier. However, in
the low (relative to dimensionality) data regime this
can be problematic. Figure 1 shows an example where
the usual margin classifier has issues. Maximizing the
minimum margin leads to a classifier with high ex-
pected classification error because only a small amount
of the data lies at the boundaries of the two classes.
The manifold-like structure of the two classes leads
to a situation where much of the data lies away from
the boundary. A natural question to ask is how mar-
gin classifiers may be modified in order to better use
data away from the boundary to improve predictions
in situations similar to the above shown example.
Given the manifold-like example above, one possiblity
is to use manifold regularization techniques. In fact,
manifold regularization has been found useful in sev-
eral regression settings [Belkin, Niyogi, and Sindhwani,
2006, ?, Aswani et al., 2011, ?]. However, a disadvan-
tage of manifold regularization is that it requires the
indirect step of first estimating the manifold, and then
using the estimated manifold for regularization. This
indirect step can contribute to high levels of estima-
tion error that often undo its regularizing effect. Our
goal then is to design a regularizer that provides ben-
efits in the manifold-like setting but does not require
estimation of any manifolds.
In this section, we develop and study a new regulariza-
tion for margin classifiers. We begin by proving a new
generalization bound that demonstrates how maximiz-
ing the minimum margin does not always lead to min-
imal expected classification error. This generalization
bound is used to motivate our new regularization for
any margin classifier, which we call the average margin
(AM) regularization. Next, we provide a probabilistic
interpretation of this regularization in the context of
deep learning. We conclude the section by discussing
AM regularization in the special context of SVM. It is
shown how this regularization can be used for kernel
SVM, and then a result is given showing how AM reg-
ularization can simultaneously improve expected clas-
sification error and robustness to adversarial perturba-
tions; this is significant because it is in direct contrast
to results on adversarial training [Tsipras et al., 2018]
that find a strict trade-off between classifier accuracy
and robustness to adversarial perturbations.
3.1 Average Margin Generalization Bound
Classical results on the generalization error of classi-
fiers [Bartlett and Mendelson, 2002] provide justifica-
tion for maximizing the minimum margin of classifiers.
Below, we present a new generalization bound in terms
of the average margin of a classifier.
Theorem 1. Let L(h) = E(1(y 6= sign(h(x)))) be the
expected classification error rate of h, Kγ(h) = #{i :
yih(xi) ≤ γ}/n be the fraction of data with γ-margin
mistakes, J(h) = 1n
∑n
i=1 yih(xi) be the average clas-
sification margin, and suppose that supx |h(x)| ≤ c for
all h ∈ H. Then for any ζ ∈ [0, 1] we have with proba-
bility at least 1− 2δ that
L(h) ≤ ζ · (1− J(h)/c) + (1− ζ) ·Kγ(h)+
4
Rn(H)
γ
+
√
log(log2
4c
γ )
n
+
√
log(1/δ)
2n
. (1)
for all γ ∈ (0, c] and all h ∈ H.
Proof. This proof uses a similar argument to the proof
of Theorem 2 by ?, with suitable modifications made
to apply to our setting. Define the functions
lγ(u) =

1, u ≤ 0
1− u/γ, 0 < u < γ
0, u ≥ γ
(2)
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and `γ(u) = ζ · (1− u/c) + (1− ζ) · lγ(u). Let Lγ(h) =
E(`γ(yh(x))) and Lˆγ(h) = 1n
∑n
i=1 `γ(yih(xi)). We will
consider the values γk = c/2
k and δk = δ/(k + 1)
2 for
k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. Since `γk(u) is Lipschitz with constant
ζ/c + (1 − ζ)/γk ≤ 1/γk, applying Theorem 7 from
Bartlett and Mendelson [2002] gives that
Lγk(h) ≤ Lˆγk(h) +
2
γk
Rn(H) +
√
log(1/δk)
2n
(3)
holds with probability at least 1−δk for all h ∈ H. Next
observe that for any ζ ∈ [0, 1], γ > 0, and any h ∈ H;
we have L(h) ≤ Lγ(h) and Lˆγ ≤ ζ · (1 − J(h)/c) +
(1 − ζ) ·Kγ(h). Thus with probability at least 1 − δk
we have
L(h) ≤ ζ · (1− J(h)/c) + (1− ζ) ·Kγk(h)+
2
γk
Rn(H) +
√
log(1/δk)
2n
(4)
for all h ∈ H. Applying the union bound over all k ∈
{0, 1, . . .} gives that (5) holds with probability at least
1 − pi2δ/6 ≥ 1 − 2δ for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . .} and h ∈ H.
Now we will assume that this union event occurs. This
directly implies (1) holds for γ = c. Next consider γ ∈
(0, c), and choose the k such that γk ≤ γ < γk−1.
Observe that k ≤ log2(c/γ) + 1, and so
L(h) ≤ ζ · (1− J(h)/c) + (1− ζ) ·Kγ(h)+
4
γ
Rn(H) +
√
log(1/δ) + 2 log(log2(4c/γ))
2n
(5)
since Kγk(h) ≤ Kγ(h), 1/γk ≤ 2/γ, and log(1/δk) ≤
log(1/δ) + 2 log(log2(4c/γ)).
This result is easiest to interpret in the special case of
perfect separation Kγ(h) = 0 by the margin γ. Then
the bound of the theorem is
L(h) ≤ ζ · (1− J(h)/c) + 4Rn(H)
γ
+√
log(log2
4c
γ )
n
+
√
log(1/δ)
2n
. (6)
This has a term inverse to the margin γ and a
term decreasing with larger average margin J(h) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 yih(xi). Thus, this result suggests that classi-
fiers should attempt to balance between maximizing
the minimum margin (which is the classic intuition)
and maximizing the average margin, and reexamining
Figure 1 visualizes the intuition in this result.
3.2 Average Margin Regularization
Given the above intuition, we propose that the aver-
age margin 1n
∑n
i=1 yih(xi) can be used as a regular-
ization term for any margin classifier. Specifically, an
AM-regularized classifier can be computed by solving
min
h∈H
1
n
∑n
i=1 `(yih(xi))− µ · 1n
∑n
i=1 yih(x), (7)
where µ ≥ 0 is a tuning parameter. Note that we sub-
tract the average margin term because we are perform-
ing a minimization.
Next, we consider deep learning with activation func-
tion exp(h(x))/(1 + exp(h(x)). The logistic loss is of-
ten used to construct classifiers, and the corresponding
AM-regularized network is computed by solving
min
h∈H
1
n
∑n
i=1 log(1+exp(−yih(xi)))−µ· 1n
∑n
i=1 yih(xi),
(8)
where µ ≥ 0 is again a tuning parameter. Now suppose
we use the labels t = (1 + y)/2 ∈ {0, 1}, and we make
the identifications that pˆ0(x) = 1/(1 + exp(h(x))) and
pˆ1(x) = exp(h(x))/(1 + exp(h(x))). Then training the
AM-regularized network is equivalent to solving
min
h∈H
− 1n
∑n
i=1
[
ti log(pˆ1(x)) + (1− ti) log(pˆ0(x))
]
+
− µ · 1n
∑n
i=1 ti log
pˆ1(x)
pˆ0(x)
+
− µ · 1n
∑n
i=1(1− ti) log pˆ0(x)pˆ1(x) . (9)
The first term is the cross-entropy, whereas the last
two terms are negative log-likelihood ratios. Thus, in
the deep learning context our AM regularization is in-
terpreted as encouraging larger log-likelihood ratios.
In analogy to hypothesis testing, a larger log-likelihood
ratio makes it easier to distinguish between classes.
3.3 Special Case of SVM
Here, we consider AM regularization in the special case
of SVM. First, consider linear SVM with h(x) = xTβ+
b. Then the AM-regularized linear SVM is given by
min λ‖β‖2 + 1n
∑n
i=1 si − µ · 1n
∑n
i=1 yi(x
T
i β + b)
s.t. yi(x
T
i β + b) ≥ 1− si, for i = 1, . . . , n
si ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . , n
(10)
As seen above, one advantage of AM regularization is
that it simply consists of an additional linear term in
the objective function. Thus, AM regularization does
not significantly affect the computational complexity
of solving the linear SVM optimization problem.
Another benefit of AM regularization is that it can be
easily dualized, which allows for the use of AM regu-
larization in kernel SVM. A standard argument using
the KKT conditions shows that the kernel SVM with
AM regularization is computed by solving
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min zT
(
yyT ◦K(X,X))z − 1nzT
s.t. yzT = 0
µ
1+µ · 1λn ≤ z ≤ 1λn
(11)
This kernel SVM formulation provides further insights
into the impact of AM regularization: It shows that
increasing µ increases the impact of points away from
the margin, thereby mixing the original support vec-
tors with an average over all data points.
Last, we show that AM regularization can generate
classifiers that both improve classification accuracy
and robustness. Let L(h, e) = E(maxδ:‖δ‖≤e 1(y 6=
h(x + δ))) be the generalization error of classifier h
when the adversary can perturb data by e magnitude.
We specifically prove a result that essentially uses a
formalization of the intuition shown in Figure 1.
Proposition 1. Let hˆAM and hˆL2 be the linear classi-
fiers computed by SVM with and without AM regular-
ization, respectively, using n = 4k ≥ 4 points sampled
from a data distribution. Recalling (10), we assume λ
is chosen so that all sampled points lie beyond the mar-
gin, that µ can be chosen based on the sampled data,
and that without loss of generality the linear classifier
has no intercept term (i.e. h(x) = xTβ). There exists
a data distribution such that
L(hˆAM , e) < L(hˆL2, e), for e ∈ [0, 7
√
5/25)
L(hˆAM , e) = L(hˆL2, e), for e ∈ [7
√
5/25, 15
√
5/25)
L(hˆAM , e) > L(hˆL2, e), for e ∈ [15
√
5/25,
√
5)
L(hˆAM , e) = L(hˆL2, e), for e ∈ [
√
5, 2
√
5)
L(hˆAM , e) < L(hˆL2, e), for e ∈ [2
√
5, 110
√
5/25)
L(hˆAM , e) = L(hˆL2, e), for e ∈ [110
√
5/25,∞)
Proof. We consider a balanced data distribution with
y2i−1 = +1 and y2i = −1 for i = 1, . . . , 2k. Suppose
x2i−1 = (10, 0) and x2i = (−10, 0) for i = k+1, . . . , 2k.
For i = 1, . . . , k: let ai = +1 be the event that x2i−1 =
(1, 2) and x2i = (−1,−2), and let ai = −1 be the event
that x2i−1 = (1,−2) and x2i = (−1, 2). We assume the
ai are independent Rademacher random variables.
Let I = {1, . . . , k}, and observe that the margin as-
sumption on λ implies the classifier satisfies yix
T
i β ≥ 1
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Also, define the conditional expec-
tation L(h, e,A) = E[maxδ:‖δ‖≤e 1(y 6= h(x + δ))|A]
for some event A. Clearly, choosing µ = 0 removes
the effect of AM regularization and ensures that
L(hˆAM , e,A) ≤ L(hˆL2, e,A).
Now consider the event B where ai = +1 for all
i ∈ I. Here, the margin assumption means the clas-
sifier must satisfy 10β1 ≥ 1, β1 + 2β2 ≥ 1. A straight-
forward calculation gives that hˆL2 has βˆL2 = (
1
5 ,
2
5 )
and L(hˆL2, e,B) = 14 + 141(e ≥
√
5) + 121(e ≥ 2
√
5).
The AM-regularized SVM is computed by solving
min λ‖β‖2 − 2µk · (β1 + 2β2)− 2µk · (10β1)
s.t. 10β1 ≥ 1
β1 + 2β1 ≥ 1
(12)
Now suppose we choose the largest µ such that the
optimal solution satisfies 10β1 > 1 and β1 + 2β1 =
1. Then it can be easily verified that this largest
value is µ = λ/(15k), and so a straightforward cal-
culation gives that hˆAM has βˆAM = (
11
15 ,
2
15 ) and
L(hˆAM , e,B) = 141(e ≥ 7
√
5/25)+ 141(e ≥ 15
√
5/25)+
1
21(e ≥ 110
√
5/25).
This means that L(hˆAM , e,B) < L(hˆL2, e,B) for e ∈
[0,
√
5) and L(hˆAM , e,B) = L(hˆL2, e,B) for e ≥
√
5.
And as discussed earlier, choosing µ = 0 for the
event ¬B ensures that L(hˆAM , e,¬B) ≤ L(hˆL2, e,¬B).
Next note B,¬B partition the sample space, and that
P(B) > 0. Hence the result follows from directly using
the law of total expectation.
This is a more subtle result than that of Tsipras et al.
[2018], which considers L(·, e) for adversarially trained
classifiers at only two discrete values of e. Our anal-
ysis shows that AM regularization can both increase
classifier accuracy (i.e., at e = 0) and robustness to ad-
versarial perturbations for specific data distributions.
This is seen because AM regularization generally has
lower expected classification error over the whole range
of e except for a very narrow range. The AM regular-
ization is less robust when e ∈ [15√5/25,√5) because
it has made a careful tradeoff between maximizing the
margin and maximizing the average margin.
Another point to note is that for the data distribu-
tion in the above proposition, the adversarially trained
SVM does not improve upon the standard SVM.
Proposition 2. Let hˆDγ be the linear classifier com-
puted by adversarially trained SVM where the adver-
sary can perturb data by γ ∈ [0,√5) and let hˆL2 be the
linear classifier computed by SVM, using n = 4k ≥
4 points sampled from a data distribution. Recalling
(10), we assume λ is chosen so that all sampled (and
perturbed) points lie beyond the margin, and that with-
out loss of generality the linear classifier has no inter-
cept term (i.e. h(x) = xTβ). Then, for the distribution
that is considered in the proof of Proposition 1, we have
that L(hˆDγ , e) = L(hˆL2, e) for all e ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows a similar
argument to that for Proposition 1.
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Figure 2: Robustness to adversarial corruptions of classifiers trained on synthetic data.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use synthetic and real data to com-
pare AM regularization to other regularizations, in-
cluding adversarial training, for both linear SVM and
deep neural networks. We first present the benchmark
regularization methods that we compare AM regular-
ization to. Next, we present empirical results for linear
SVM using synthetic data, and we conclude this sec-
tion by presenting numerical results for linear SVM
and deep neural networks applied to a real dataset.
4.1 SVM Benchmarks
We compare linear SVM with AM regularization to
regular SVM, SVM with an `1 regularization term in-
stead of the typical `2 regularizer, the robust SVM
training method of Song, Hu, and Xie [2002], and the
adversarial training method outlined by Trafalis and
Gilbert [2007], Xu, Caramanis, and Mannor [2009],
Bertsimas et al. [2017].
Song et al. This method relies on minimizing the
impact of outliers on the design of the separator.
Specifically, it avoids the over-reliance on such out-
liers by shifting the loss according to the distance of a
point to its respective centroid:
minλ‖β‖2+
1
n
∑n
i=1
(
1− yi(βTxi + b)− γ‖xi − µyi‖22
)
+
, (13)
where µyi is the centroid for class yi, and λ, γ ≥ 0 are
tuning parameters.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training frames
the training of SVM as a bilevel program, where the
loss is minimized not over the original data {xi}ni=1,
but rather over worst-case perturbations of the data
{xi + δi}ni=1, where the perturbations δi are restricted
to be in some space. If we restrict ‖δi‖q ≤ γ for some
norm ‖ · ‖q, this can be modeled as
min λ‖β‖2 + 1n
∑n
i=1 si
s.t. yi(β
Txi + b)− γ‖β‖q∗ ≥ 1− si, for i = 1, . . . , n
si ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . , n
(14)
where ‖ · ‖q∗ is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖q. In this section,
we consider the case where q = 2.
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Figure 3: We compare the accuracy and adversarial robustness of AM-regularized classifiers to classifiers trained
with other forms of regularization. AM-regularization strictly dominates other regularizations in our experiments.
4.2 Deep Learning Benchmarks
We also test different regularizations for deep clas-
sifiers. We train a model with two 16-filter 5 × 5
convolutional layers, each followed by a 2 × 2 max-
pooling layer, proceeded by one 1024-neuron dense
layer and a final layer that outputs activations. On
these activations, we use the standard cross-entropy
loss along with our AM regularizer. Logit weights were
`2-regularized at variable rates. For the results in Fig-
ure 3b and Table 2, λ refers to the `2 regularization,
and µ to the weight given to our AM regularization.
Slight `1 penalties were added to all other weights in
the network, as is common in image classifiers. Adap-
tive gradient descent was used for training, and all
relevant parameters (other than λ and µ) were chosen
to optimize the unmodified model and kept constant
throughout all models.
We also compare to the adversarial method outlined by
Madry et al. [2017]. Similar to the adversarial model
in SVM, this adversarial model requires training on
adversarially-perturbed images instead of the original
images. Adversarial images are generated via the itera-
tive Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), which back-
propagates the gradient of the loss function back onto
the image itself, and then takes a step in the direction
that is most likely to confuse the model. The most
successful variant of this aims to make an adversarial
image which will be classified as the class with the low-
est confidence score in the prediction on the original
image: that is, if “1” was the least-likely outcome for
a particular image according to the unmodified model,
then a gradient step would be taken to minimize the
loss of the model with respect to the classification “1”.
Table 1: Comparison of linear SVM regularizations
when distinguishing 0’s from 1’s in the MNIST dataset.
All models trained on a randomly chosen 10% of
the available MNIST training data, and evaluated on
the full evaluation set. All adversarial corruptions are
bounded within an `2 ball around the original data,
with the corruption level describing the radius of the
ball of allowed corruptions. The results shown are av-
eraged over 50 repetitions of this procedure.
Corruption 0.01 0.2 1.0
`2-regularized 0.940 0.938 0.921
`1-regularized 0.997 0.995 0.714
AM-regularized 0.998 0.997 0.983
Adversarial 0.996 0.995 0.979
Song et al. 0.994 0.992 0.974
We use this method and, for each pixel and for each
iteration, take a step of size ε = 0.02 in the direc-
tion of the sign of the gradient. Our adversarial models
were trained on images generated after 20 iterations of
FGSM on the analogous non-adversarial models.
4.3 Synthetic Data with Linear SVM
We next run randomized experiments to demonstrate
situations where AM regularization is beneficial. We
generate U+, U− by taking the Q from a QR de-
composition done on a matrix of size d × m with
standard normal entries, and µ+, µ− ∈ Rd to have
uniformly-distributed entries between 0 and 2. Then,
we set x = ΠU+µ+ + U+v+ + ε+ when y = +1, and
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Table 2: Robustness of deep classifiers with respect to adversarial perturbations, averaged over 5 runs. Our
method is able to outdo all others in accuracy on both the clean evaluation set and adversarially-perturbed
evaluation sets.
Iterations of FGSM
mode λ µ 0 10 20 30 40 50
Unregularized 0.00 0 0.9383 0.9352 0.9277 0.9112 0.8732 0.8063
`2-regularized
0.01 0 0.9448 0.9418 0.9322 0.9107 0.8636 0.7832
0.10 0 0.9477 0.9457 0.9401 0.9285 0.9022 0.8443
AM-regularized
0.01 1e-5 0.9439 0.9410 0.9335 0.9167 0.8824 0.8177
0.01 1e-4 0.9481 0.9453 0.9365 0.9187 0.8883 0.8345
0.10 1e-5 0.9471 0.9445 0.9391 0.9288 0.9054 0.8548
0.10 1e-4 0.9499 0.9477 0.9422 0.9318 0.9101 0.8637
Adversarial
0.00 0 0.9415 0.9379 0.9302 0.9137 0.8739 0.7967
0.01 0 0.9462 0.9429 0.9327 0.9098 0.8592 0.7744
0.10 0 0.9485 0.9464 0.9407 0.9294 0.9040 0.8487
x = ΠU−µ− + U−v− + ε−, where
v+ ∼ N (µ+, Im), ε+ ∼ N (0d, εId),
v− ∼ N (µ−, Im), ε− ∼ N (0d, εId).
(15)
A training set of 1000 samples {(xi, yi)} of such data
was created. Nested subsets of this training set were
used for training various models, meaning that the
training set for the model trained on 10% of the data
was a strict subset of that trained on 30% of the data,
etc. All models were then tested on a common test-
ing set (of the same distribution) of 10,000 samples
with adversarial corruption of various magnitude. This
procedure was repeated 100 times with ε = 0.01 and
d = 200, and the results for various training-set sizes
and for various values of m are presented in Figure 2.
Our method improves both robustness and accuracy
in low-data and low-dimensionality regimes.
4.4 MNIST Experiments
Next, we use the classic MNIST dataset [?] to evaluate
AM regularization.
Linear SVM Results In Table 1, we compare AM-
regularization to the benchmark methods. For simplic-
ity, we focus on the binary classification problem of
separating hand-drawn 0’s from hand-drawn 1’s, and
report results from training on 10% of available train-
ing data. All hyperparameter values were set using 5-
fold cross-validation on the training set. We repeat this
process 50 times for each model, and report the accu-
racy results on a common testing set corrupted with
various degrees of adversarial perturbations. We note
that our method achieves better or almost equivalent
accuracy with low corruption, and is best able to retain
that level of accuracy at high levels of corruption.
Deep Classifier Results All deep classifier mod-
els were trained on 1% of the MNIST training data,
and we report evaluations on the full test set. Fig-
ure 3b shows the robustness of each method to FGSM,
for one run of the aforementioned procedure. Table 2
presents similar results averaged over 5 runs of the
procedure. We note that, for relatively small values of
µ, our method is able to significantly and consistently
outperform the unmodified, `2-regularized, and adver-
sarial methods in both accuracy and robustness.
5 CONCLUSION
Based on a novel generalization bound, we have pro-
posed in this paper a new form of regularization, for
margin classifiers and deep neural networks, that we
call average margin (AM) regularization. Our theoret-
ical and empirical results support its use by showing
that AM regularization can increase both classifier ac-
curacy and adversarial robustness. Taken together, our
results suggest that adversarial fragility in deep learn-
ing is an issue of overfitting, rather than a fundamental
uniqueness of adversarial perturbations.
One future topic is to better understand AM regular-
ization’s theoretical properties. We believe AM regu-
larization works best in the finite sample regime and
that its asymptotic behavior when µ 6→ 0 may be
poor. Another topic is to consider modified forms of
AM regularization. For instance, we could imagine
a hinged average margin (HAM) regularization that
adds −µ · 1n
∑n
i=1(γ − yih(xi))+, where µ, γ ≥ 0 are
tuning parameters. HAM regularization may improve
AM regularization by providing saturation, whereby
points very far (specifically γ distance away) from the
margin are not considered in the average margin cal-
culation. Promisingly, this is convex in yih(xi).
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